## **Afghanistan Situation Report**

25X1

4 January 1983

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NESA M 83-10001CX SOVA M 83-10003CX

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT	
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CHRISTMAS IN KABUL	
Insurgent activity in and around Kabul during the end of December indicates that while the regime's control in the capital is still strong, the surrounding area remains a no man's land.	25 <b>X</b> 1
LATEST ROUND OF SOVIET COMMENT ON AFGHANISTAN	
The Soviets continue to tailor their Afghan comment to meet varying objectives in different places.	25 <b>X</b> 1
IN BRIEF	
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
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CHRISTMAS IN KABUL	25X1
During the anniversary week of the Soviet invasion, the insurgents did not launch any spectacular operations, but sporatic gunfire could be heard through many of the nights. The insurgents did interrupt totally the capital's supply of electricity for the first time by blowing up five power transmission pylons outside the city. The regime, for its part, organized an anti-US demonstration of 18,000 to 20,000 people,	i
which—although unenthusiastic—was the largest to date.  Comment: The Afghan government's ability to limit resistance activity to sporatic fighting during the anniversary of the Soviet invasion suggests that its security network in Kabul is relatively effective. Similarly, its ability to organize a large, if sullen, number of demonstrators underscores its control of the Kabul populace. The insurgents' capability to cause the power blackout, however, demonstrates that government control	25X1 25X1
remains weak just a few miles outside the capital.	25X1
A TASS statement on Afghanistan issued on December 31 authoritatively reiterates Moscow's interest in a political settlement and denies Soviet use of chemical warfare. It calls Administration statements about Soviet intentions in Asia and the Middle East "dirty political speculation" and says Western	25X1
efforts to hold relations with the USSR hostage to developments in Afghanistan evoke only "surprise and censure".	25 <b>X</b> 1
Earlier this month, a visiting scholar from the USA Institute told a group of US academics that General Secretary Andropov wanted to extricate the USSR from Afghanistan. He alleged the Soviets were encouraging India to reach a rapprochement with	25X1 •
Pakistan so as to reduce Islamabad's concern about India and its need for US security.	<b>*</b> 25X1

Twice immediately prior to the issuance of the TASS statement, Soviet officials with prior access to Andropov in Moscow also

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told US officials	privately that he is looking for a way out	of be
the USSR's Afghan expendable.	problem. One even ninced basian magne	
Comment: The	Soviets hope that the appearance of great	ter
facilitate resumpt	problems like Afghanistan and Kampuchea v tion of bilateral dialogues with the West	and
China. At the same	me time, they recognize the danger that too mundermine an already fragile regime in Kab	bul.
The TASS statement for Kabul since Br	t is the fourth <u>public gesture</u> of Soviet supp	ort
	e not encouraging India and Pakistan to imp	rove
relations.	e not choose again	25
IEF		
	Ariana,	the
	will soon begin passenger flights to Prague	and
East Berlin via M landing rights l	lost in western Europe, but Austria, or o	other
small countries,	may still eventually grant such rights.	
UN Special Repr	resentative Cordovez plans to arrive in Tehra	an on
21 January, be	in Islamabad 23-25 January, go to Kabu n return to Islamabad 30-31 January.	1 26
January, and then		
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